What now?

Alan Johnston has been freed

Had a conversation about the middle east for the first time in a while. I am at french camp, and shouldn`t technically even be writting this in English . But I am, don`t you dare tell them. Its really cool, if you are interested, i`ll type up something in french

So, the questions on everyone`s mind is what to do with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? I was just quickly going to go through a couple of likely scenarios and the likely outcome over the next few days

1) Scenario 1: Hamas-Fatah split continues.

Likely outcomes:

-Deterorating Humanitarian conditions in Gaza, continued Hamas Arms buildup.

I have been critical of the aid embargo on Hamas in the past, and the civil war proved that it has failed to achieve even its most basic goal. Allegedly, the goal of the embargo was to promote Hamas to compromise, to limit the amount of military supplies procured by the organization, and to support moderate elements. If anything, the Aid embargo has been counterproductive on all counts.

i)Compromise: With a new base of opperations in Gaza there is very little reason for Hamas to compromise. Military action, not democratic choice, brought results, a piece (impovershed and poor) of land without (israeli) checkpoints is under their control. The comparison to the West Bank, with settlements, checkpoints, and curfews will be apparent.

Without international strings, there is no threat that the international community can use against them. Clearly, they have created an alternative fundraising capacity, making it even less likely that effective preassure will be able to be brought to bear in the future. The boycott has on the other hand destroyed both the public and private sectors, and resulted in alarming rise in mortality and poverty.

ii) Moderate Elements: Unsubtle and open funding of the PA and other organizations seems to have polarized the Palestinian community, which will invariable lead to more radicalization and a smaller likelyhood for compromise.

iii) Military Funding: Clearly, Humanitarian aid was Fungable for Hamas, it was a secondary aim. If the volume of weapons through the Egypt-Gaza border is any indication, Hamas hasn`t been skimping on the important stuff (see: guns). Arms build up and arms smuggling is expensive, you have to transport it, it could get caught, you have to bribe people, and the sellers know that they have a captive market (or else the dealer will tip off the authorities).This suggests that either

-they are flush with cash (the boycott didn`t work) OR
-that it may well have transfered money away from their Humanitarian wing towards Military expenditure (the boycott didn`t work).

This movement may even have been facilitated by the increase in international aid and food relief to Gaza. Either way, their fundraising capacities don`t seem to have been diminished, while people in Gaza suffer.

Arms purchases are likely to increase, not decrease. When Hamas gets more money, it might transfer abit to the humanitarian side, but the military wing will always come first, particularly since they will be (sensibly) expecting a move against them to be coming soon.

Worse, even lifting the boycott now will not help things, since a smuggling infrastucture has been put in place. They know the system well enough, who to bribe who not to bribe, and where to buy it and how to move stuff across. People are benefiting from a conflict economy which has its own forward momentum towards perpetuating the conflict.

Likely Hamas will use the opportunity to increase smuggling, and augment international income from clandestine flows. In the unlikely scenario when the boycott on Hamas is lifted we`d likely see an improvement in humanitarian conditions, as well as an increase in rearmerment.

-Fatah and Israel cooperate further.

Fatah will need to show some sort of tangible gains to the public to make up for its disasterous showing in the war, and will remain economically dependent on Israel to pay its public sector employees. It will also likely become dependent on Western military aid, but likely not in substantial quantities, since the Israelis will be worried about it being used against them.

-Continued corruption and declining service quality in the West Bank, and a lack of effective Fatah military leadership

Training and weaponry is one thing, but if the civil war proved anything, it is that without an effective leadership, numbers and guns don`t matter at all. I seriously doubt that the Fatah leadership, seriously discredited and fearful that the knives are coming out, will promote the most effective commander over the most loyal (often times corrupt) commaders in the security services. It is likely this sort of patronage that limited their effectiveness in the first fight. To expect better next time is unlikely.

-A militarized Gaza, with an increasingly entrenched Hamas.

There is no economy, nothing going in, or out, and very little chance of any sort of short term reprieve. The only option for stability is to militarize the entire society, bring it under the Hamas umbrella. This way it can protect against the external enemy (israel) and the internal one (fatah).

Once again, these are just guesses, i`ll write more in the days to come

~ by brownbomber on July 4, 2007.